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THE IMPACT OF THE STEIN CASES ON THE PRACTICE
OF DEPUTIZING THE CORPORATION
by
Regina M. Robson •

The use of prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions has
been a potent tool for enlisting cooperation by organizational
defendants facing charges of white collar crime. Federal
policies have encouraged organizations to demonstrate their
cooperation by becoming de facto members of the prosecutor's
team and by pressuring employees to waive their constitutional
rights. Recently, a series of rulings in the case of United States
v. Stein, 1 has raised issues which may have a significant
impact on the way in which federal prosecutors use
organizational cooperation to assist them in conducting
criminal investigations.
The Stein cases were the first to consider the impact of
federal policies designed to encourage organizational
cooperation on the constitutional rights of employees under
criminal investigation. In attributing the actions of the
corporate defendant to the government for Fifth Amendment
purposes, the Stein court made the prosecutor liable for the
actions of its corporate "deputy," and suggested possible limits
on the utilization of information procured by organizational
defendants anxious to avoid prosecution by demonstrating their
own cooperation.

I. BACKGROUND: THE DIFFICULTY IN
INVESTIGATING WHITE COLLAR CRIME AND THE
ARTFUL USE OF PROSEUCTORIAL DISCRETION
• Assistant Professor, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
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The term "white collar crime" is commonly used to refer to
the non-violent actions of a person or business for the purpose
2
of wrongfully obtaining property or an illegal advantage.
Since white collar crime typically occurs during the course of
an otherwise legitimate business,3 victims may be unaware that
a crime has been committed at all, with little ability to identify
the perpetrator. Moreover, organizational decision making may
be so dispersed that no single individual within an organization
may have actual knowledge of the entire range of illegitimate
activities.4 Consequently, the expertise and cooperation of
5
insiders is critical if the prosecutor is to establish a case.
One of the prosecutor's most potent tools in securing timely
and meaningful cooperation by insiders is prosecutorial
discretion: the prosecutor's right to determine whether to
6
prosecute, whom to prosecute and what charges to bring.
Moreover, prosecutorial discretion is not subject to legal
.
7
review.
For business entities facing criminal charges, 8 there is an
overwhelming incentive to convince the J'rosecutor to exercise
discretion in favor of pre-trial diversion. It was in recognition
of the value of organizational cooperation in the investigational
stage of a proceeding, that the government issued Federal
Prosecution of Corporations in 1999 (hereinafter the "Holder
Memorandum"), which identified a list of factors to be
considered in evaluating corporate cooperation. 10
The years after the adoption of the Holder Memorandum
witnessed the prosecution of a number of well known
corporations, and a crisis in confidence in the financial
markets. 11 Acting on recommendations of the Corporate Fraud
Task Force, in 2003, Assistant Attorney General Larry
Thompson issued Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations, which became known as the
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Thompson Memorandum. 12 Unlike the Holder Memorandum
which functioned only as guidance to prosecutors, the
Thompson Memorandum directed prosecutors to consider nine
specific factors that evidenced the "authenticity" of an
organization's cooperation with a criminal investigation. 13 The
most controversial factors included:
[T]he corporation's willingness to
identify the culprits within the
corporation ... ; to make witnesses available;
[and] to disclose the complete results of its
internal investigation; 14
... [A] corporation's promise of support
for culpable employees and agents, either
through the advancing of attorneys fees,
[or] through retaining the employees
without sanction for their misconduct .. .. 15
The impact of the Thompson Memorandum was to propel
corporate "cooperation" from a passive, non-obstructionist
attitude, to active participation in the government's
investigation. In a speech shortly after the promulgation of the
Thompson Memorandum, then Assistant Attorney General
Christopher Wray succinctly advised business organizations
seeking to avoid prosecution: "[Y]ou have to get all the way on
board and do your best to assist the Government. " 16 The
corporation had to become a "deputy" prosecutor; it had to
"help the government catch the crooks." 17
If the cooperation expected from business organizations was
expansive, so too were the rewards. The years following the
issuance of the Thompson Memorandum witnessed a
significant increase in the number of pre-trial diversions of
corporate defendants. 18 At the same time, prosecution of
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individual defendants increased, 19 resulting in what Lisa
Griffin has described as "inverted entity liability" with
individual defendants more likely to be prosecuted than their
corporate employers.20
Not surprisingly, the Thompson Memorandum sparked
widespread criticism 21 with relatively few defenders.22 The
"cooperation" demanded by the Thompson Memorandum has
been criticized as an impingement on corporate constitutional
24
protections; 23 a trampling of individuals' constitutional rights;
a seismic shift from an accusatory system to an inquisitorial
system of justice;25 and an impetus to false and unreliable
statements. 26 It is the application of these constitutionally
sensitive provisions of the Thompson Memorandum which
were at the center of the controversy adjudicated in the Stein
cases, the first cases to consider the constitutional implications
. . 27
o f sueh po1ICies.
II. ACTION AND REACTION: THE STEIN CASES AND
THE McNULTY MEMORANDUM
The Stein cases grew out of a criminal investigation of the
firm of KPMG LLP for tax fraud, based on its creation and
marketing of certain tax shelters.28 The hostile tone of the
Congressional hearings on tax shelters convinced KPMG that it
29
"intended to cooperate in order to save the firm." After
lengthy negotiation with the United States Attorney's Office
("USAO"), KPMG ultimately entered into a Deferred
Prosecution Agreement ("DPA") on August 29, 2005. 30 KPMG
employees did not fare so well and shortly thereafter the
government filed its initial indictment against individual
defendants.31 The individual defendants, all present or former
32
KPMG employees, were the claimants in the Stein cases.
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A prosecutor may elect to enter into a DPA if, in the opinion
of the USAO, the corporation has demonstrated
"cooperation."33 What form that "cooperation" took, and its
impact on the constitutional rights of the individual defendants
was the subject of two separate actions, Stein I and Stein II.
In Stein I, the court held that KPMG's termination of
advancement of attorneys' fees to the individual defendants
violated their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 34 Although it declined to dismiss
the indictments against the individual defendants, the court
invited them to bring an action against KPMG for the recovery
of their legal expenses. 35 While a detailed analysis of the Due
Process and Sixth Amendment right to counsel claims are
beyond the scope of this paper, recent cases suggest that with
regard to these issues, Stein I may be limited to its somewhat
convoluted facts .36
In Stein II, nine individual defendants claimed that certain
statements made in response to KPMG's threats were the result
ofunlawful government coercion in violation of the
defendants' Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination. 37 Observing that the Fifth Amendment restricts
governmental and not private conduct,38 the Stein court noted
that economic pressure exerted by an employer could amount
to unconstitutional coercion only if such action could be
"fairly attributable" to the government. 39 The court relied on
United States ex ref Sanney v. Montanye 40 to illustrate the
connection between government action and economic leverage
leveled by private actors. Montanye involved a private
employer who conducted a polygraph of an employee who was
suspected ofmurder. 41 The employer conducted the polygraph
at the request of the police department, and transmitted
information directly to it through the use of a hidden
transmitter.42 The employer threatened the employee with
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43

termination if he refused to submit to the polygraph. In
attributing the action of the employer to the police, the
Montanye court held that "[t]he state had involved itself in the
use of a substantial economic threat to coerce a person into
furnishing an incriminating statement."44 Applying the
Montanye standard the Stein court held that KPMG's threats to
'
45
cut off legal fees were attributable to the government.
By
brandishing a big stick - the threat of indictment - and offering
a tempting carrot - the possibility of a deferred prosecution
.
46
agreement - the government made KPMG a part o f Its team.
47

I

The court also distinguished two second circuit cases
which found that actions of stock exchanges in proceedings
against member brokers could not be attributed to the SEC for
Fifth Amendment purposes, despite the fact that the exchanges
routinely communicated the results of their investigation to the
SEC. The Stein court noted that while the stock exchanges
had commenced an investigation as part of administering their
own rules, independent of a government request, the actions of
KPMG were not routine self-policing, but were initiated
because of a government investigation, aimed squarely at
KPMG itself. 48 Although the findings of investigations
conducted by the exchanges were routinely reported to the
SEC, the SEC had no prior knowledge of the investigations
and had not pressured the exchanges to commence an
inquiry.49 In contrast, the Stein court found that the
government had "quite deliberately coerced and in any case,
significantl6' encouraged," KPMG to pressure its employees to
cooperate. 5 The court found that both the investigatory
51
policies of the government and the misconduct of the USA0
created a clear nexus such that KPMG's actions could be
52
imputed to the government.
Shortly after the decisions in the Stein cases, criticism of the
Thompson Memorandum appeared to reach a tipping point and

Privilege Protection
on December 7, 2006, the
3
Act was introduced in the Senate. The Bill prohibited
prosecutors from requesting waivers of attorney-client or work
product privileges or considering the advancement of an
employee's legal fees in any charging decision or cooperation
credit. 54
Less than five days after introduction of the Senate bill,
Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty reacted by issuing the
McNulty Memorandum. 5 5 While leaving much of the language
of the Thompson Memorandum undisturbed, the McNulty
Memorandum made two significant changes with respect to the
government's consideration of corporate cooperation: it
required explicit approval for prosecutors seeking waivers of
attorney client and work product protections; 56 and it
prohibited prosecutors from considering a corporation's
advancement of legal fees as a factor weighing against a
finding of corporate cooperation, 57 except in "rare"
circumstances approved by the Deputy Attorney General. 58
While the McNulty Memorandum can be said to have
increased the transparency of the government's requests for
information, it in no way limited the actions which a business
entity could "volunteer" to secure cooperation credit.
Moreover, it left undisturbed the fundamental principle guiding
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions:
"authentic cooperation" requires an organization to help the
prosecutor discover and prosecute wrongdoers. After almost
five years of experience with the Thompson Memorandum,
corporate counsel have a good idea of the type of cooperation
that makes a prosecutor smile. If, after the McNulty
Memorandum, prosecutors may no longer consider
advancement of fees as a failure to cooperate, that does not
mean that they cannot consider a voluntary corporate policy
which terminates or denies advancement of fees to employees
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who are targets of an investigation. 5 For the employees
involved, the outcome is virtually indistinguishable.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE STEIN CASES ON THE
PRACTICE OF "DEPUTIZING" THE CORPORATION
Given the limited impact of the McNulty Memorandum in
circumscribing the scope of corporate cooperation, the question
remains: will Stein have any impact on federal investigational
techniques? Part III of this paper considers what impact Stein
may have on the federal policy of deputizing business entities
to assist in the investigation of white collar crime and the types
of actions which signify corporate cooperation.
It is settled law that the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination does not apply to private actors, but only to state
action.60 Private employers are free to conduct internal
investigations of actual or perceived wrongdoing, and may
terminate employees who refuse to cooperate or make
statements.

The question of whether a private action can be attributed to
the government for state action purposes under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments generally arises when state and
private actions are blurred, either because the state has
delegated to a private actor an action which traditionally has
. sueh a
been the prerogative of the state, 61 or because t here IS
"close nexus" between a private action and the state as to make
62
the decisions of the private party those of the state.
Moreover, the actions of the government do not escape the
label of "state action" when the government acts in a quasi63
h
64
private manner such as an employer or pure aser.
Defendants claiming state action based on the actions of
private entities face a high hurdle. For example, courts have
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refused to consider the actions of stock exchanges in
investigating their members as state action, despite
acknowledging the responsibility ofthe exchanges for selfpolicing, arguably a function traditionally reserved to the
state. 65 Defendants claiming that pervasive government
regulation of an industry is tantamount to state action, have
66
fared no better. The fact that a private entity is highly
regulated is not sufficient, without more, to make its actions
attributable to the government. 67 In those cases where the
courts have attributed the acts of a private actor to the state,
they have done so only where the private actor admitted to
68
being an agent of the state, or where there was government
knowledge of or acquiescence to actions taken by the private
entity. 69
The question of imputing the actions of private entities to
the government has become even more critical in light of
federal policies which equate cooperation with helping to
"catch the crooks." Deputizing corporations to assist in the
investigation of white collar crime can have far ranging effects
on employees, particularly in light ofthe trend toward
prosecution of "secondary" offenses. 7 Federal statutes impose
criminal liability on any person who influences, or obstructs a
federal investigation/' or who lies to a federal agent, without
regard to whether the statement is made under oath. 72 Perhaps
the most aggressive instance of deputizing a private party
involved an investigation of Computer Associates
International, Inc. In that case, an executive pleaded guilty to a
charge of obstruction because of false statements made to
auditors and an outside law firm which he himself had hired to
conduct an internal investigation. 73 Although the statements
were not made under oath, the government took the position
that the executive was liable because he knew that the results
of the investigation were to be shared with the government in
an effort by the company to demonstrate its cooperation. 74 In

°
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effect, there was no distinction between lying to the prosecutor
and lying to an agent of the corporation.
In its investigation of Computer Associates, the government
"benefited" from the actions of its unofficial deputy by being
able to bring obstruction charges based on the statements made
to its deputy. 75 The Stein court expanded this reasoning to its
logical conclusion, holding prosecutors responsible when
corporate deputies use coercion to secure statements from
76
employees in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.
The critical inquiry, the Stein court noted, is whether the
government "commands or significantly encourages a private
entity to take the specific action."77 In Stein, the court found
that the "encouragement" took two forms : prosecutorial
misconduct and the federal policies embodied in the Thompson
Memorandum. 78 By basing its decision, not only on the actions
of the prosecutor but also on the policy itself, the court implied
that deputizing private entities to assist in federal investigations
may be constitutionally suspect - even without specific
79
requests for cooperation by individual prosecutors. The court
reasoned that the policies embodied in the Thompson
Memorandum were intended to exert enormous pressure on
target organizations for the very purpose of encouraging them
80
to coerce statements from employee defendants.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Stein court expanded the
circumstances in which the actions of a private entity can be
imputed to the government for Fifth Amendment purposes.
Analogizing to the techniques used in investigating "street
crimes," it is as if the prosecutor accepted "cooperation" from
an accused bank robber, knowing full well that the robber will
secure admissions from his accomplice by wielding a baseball
bat over his head. Stein can be read as imposing a kind of
prosecutorial "respondeat superior" wherein a prosecutor is
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strictly liable for actions of a private party trying to
demonstrate cooperation- without regard to any overt
misconduct by the prosecutor or self-interest of the corporate
deputy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ultimate impact of the decision in Stein will depend on
which strand of the court's holding proves dominant. If Stein is
viewed as a prosecutorial misconduct case, the benefits for
individual defendants asserting constitutional protections may
be short lived. The McNulty Memorandum, while providing
more transparency for prosecutors' requests for corporate
cooperation, does little to discourage over-the-top corporate
efforts to demonstrate cooperation. Hewlett-Packard
Company's recent use of "pretexting" to track down leaks in its
Boardroom suggests that corporations may have innovative
techniques for conducting internal investigations - even
without the overarching threat of a criminal indictment. 81 In the
Stein case itself, KPMG demonstrated its creative approach to
cooperation by requesting that the government identify those of
its employees who were not being fully cooperative. In an
effort to curry favor, it then boasted that it had done something
'"never heard of before'- condition[ing] the payment of
attorney 's fees on full cooperation with the investigation."82
Arguably, any policy of conditioning corporate leniency on
investigational cooperation is an impetus for organizational
actions which could be devastating to individual constitutional
rights.
If, however, subsequent courts adopt the second rationale of
Stein - the rejection of investigative policies which spur
organizations to demonstrate their cooperation at the expense
of their employees- individual subjects of criminal
investigation may find that their constitutional rights are not
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rendered moribund as soon as a corporate prosecution appears
likely. Stein lays the groundwork for a ruling that would, at a
minimum, suggest that there are some actions which a
corporation cannot even "volunteer" and which cannot be
considered by prosecutors, even if they have had no role in
requesting or encouraging the action.
Unless the challenge laid down by the Stein court is
followed by other courts in considering federal prosecutorial
policies, then Stein risks being confined to its facts, an
interesting, but ultimately minor addition, to the debate on the
evolving role of the corporation as a deputy prosecutor in white
collar criminal cases.
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TAX COURT REVERSES COURSE ON DEDUCTION FOR
MBA COSTS
by
Martin H. Zem *
I. INTRODUCTION

Anyone considering obtaining a Master of Business
Administration degree (MBA) is no doubt acutely aware that
the cost of the degree is expensive and, if past is prologue, will
continue to increase. 1 Additionally, for a full-time student,
cash is needed for everyday expenses, such as, housing, food
and utilities, which will have to be paid through borrowing or
savings. Moreover, full-time students forego opportunities for
advancement and the gaining of experience they could have by
working and going to school part time. Obviously, those
striving for an MBA anticipate that it will more than
compensate for the cost and lost opportunities. Whether the
anticipation is likely to become the reality has been questioned.
For instance, a professor teaching in a top-tier business school,
to the apparent dismay of his colleagues, has posited that MBA
holders seemed no more successful than persistent business
leaders without the degree? Nevertheless, MBA programs are
popular and likely to stay so. 3

81
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30, 2006, at C8. Other techniques included twenty-four hour surveillance,
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If the cost of the MBA can be taken as a tax deduction,
however, the cost is to some extent subsidized by the
government, the exact benefit correlated with one's tax bracket.
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